Ethical discourse, I suggest, is degraded and corrupted by fear. I’m not talking about the healthy protective fear that flows from love, but rather the unhelpful power-grasping fear that is its own source. Below I’ll suggest two equal-opposite examples of this power-grasping fear, and then I’ll offer a suggestion about a third, ‘middle’ way.
On the one hand, we can see a fearful response to ‘misbehaviour’. This kind of fear is reactive, and wants to (at best) guide or (at worst) control human behaviour. It often takes the form of wanting to ‘raise’ ethical standards, or perhaps turn back the clock to prior times where standards were ‘higher’. The logic seems to be along the lines of:
- People misbehave
- People misbehave because they don’t know what is good behaviour, and/or cultural moral standards are too permissive
- Therefore, to improve behaviour, more moral instruction and/or more strict morals is needed
On the other hand, there seems to be a fearful response, not to misbehaviour, but to the effects of perceived misbehaviour. This, too, is a reactive fear, and wants to protect people from (at best) false guilt or (at worst) any guilt. It often takes the form of ‘updating’ or loosening ethical standards. The logic seems to be something like:
- People harm themselves and others
- People harm themselves and others because they feel acute moral guilt
- Therefore, people will harm themselves and others less if we loosen ethical views that are too outdated and/or strict
The point here is not to say that morals never need to be adjusted in either direction. Arguably, they can be unhelpfully permissive or unhelpfully strict. The point has to do with the way that fear plays a role, both in the desire to make morals, ethics, and laws, more strict, or less strict.
As suggested above, fear can be helpful. Among other things, we should have a healthy fear of false guilt. Auckland-based theologian Neil Darragh calls this ‘disabling guilt’, signalling the way that victims of it are disabled from feeling and acting and being as they should. But this false guilt is flanked by what he calls ‘enabling guilt’, which – contrary to what we often hear – is actually helpful in that it assists us to face our wrongdoing, take responsibility for it, and amend our behaviour and grow morally and personally.
The problem with the two types of reactive fear above is that they tend to short-circuit moral discourse and reflection. Fear cements people, cornering them into angry and aggressive (or passive-aggressive and condescending) dismissal of those they disagree with.
Patient discussion is better. People may not instantly agree when it comes to a particular activity and whether or not feeling guilty about it is enabling or disabling. But at least they might be able to understand one another.