Pardon the double negative, but it’s not for no reason that the title of philosopher, author and atheist, Dr. Erik J. Wielenberg’s article in a recent issue of the American Theological Inquiry (yes, a theological journal published an article by an atheist) is called “OBJECTIVE MORALITY AND THE NATURE OF REALITY”. Views of morality and reality are inseparable. Ontology is logically prior to ethics. One’s views on ‘ought’ are based on one’s views on ‘is’.
My claim is this: It seems to me that atheism is characterised by a circular ontology – both quantitatively and qualitatively.
First, Atheistic Quantitative Ontology is circular in that it is self-referential. The arrow of logical explanation does not point beyond reality to an other, but turns back onto itself. Ultimate explanation rests in nature itself and not in any other entity. Reality as a whole (whether we call it nature, the universe or the multiverse) doesn’t need anything ‘else’ besides itself to be completely, fully and finally ‘explained’, and reality is self-caused, self-originating and self-ordered. Sagan transposed the Judeo-Christian meaning of the name YHWH into a naturalistic key with the assertion “The universe is all that there is, all there ever was, and all that there ever will be.” Self-existent reality is also self-explanatory. The lid of reality is closed.
Second, Atheistic Qualitative Ontology (a la Wielenberg) is circular and self-referential in that it claims that basic moral value is self-explanatory, or to use langauge more proper to the field of ethics, that it needs no foundation (!!!). Here’s some relevant excerpts from his article:
Objective morality, on this view, has no foundation external to itself. (p77, emphasis mine)
I propose, then, that objective morality rests on a foundation composed of brute ethical facts. Such ethical facts are foundational in at least two senses. First, they are ontologically foundational. By this, I mean that they have no explanation outside of themselves; no further facts make them true. Second, they are epistemologically foundational. By this, I mean that they can be known to be true in a direct way; they need not be inferred from other things that we know. (p79)
…moral properties (such as goodness) supervene or depend upon non-moral properties. Thus, if a given entity is good, it is good in virtue of or because of certain non-moral properties of that entity. Pleasure, for instance, is good because of the qualitative feel that pleasure has. Persons are valuable, and possess certain rights, because of certain capacities they have—for instance, the capacity to experience pain, and to reason. (p80)
The last quotation is particularly revealing of this qualitative ontological circularity. Pleasure is said to be ‘good’ (the most basic or foundational of qualitative, ontological judgments!) simply because of ‘the qualitative feel’ it has. In other words, pleasure is good because it is pleasurable. The foundation for the qualitative value is the qualitative judgment itself. He expands on this later in the article, laying out this “brute ethical fact”:
Necessarily, any being that can reason, suffer, experience happiness, tell the difference between right and wrong, choose between right and wrong, and set goals for itself has certain rights, including the rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and certain obligations, including the duty to refrain from rape (in typical circumstances).
Not only are ‘right and wrong’ (which the said being is meant to distinguish between!) undefined (which is the entire point of the wider discussion), but he also fails to explain why or how entities with ‘the capacity to experience pain, and to reason’ come to have ‘rights’ and ‘obligations’.
In summary of what became a longer post than intended:
- Atheistic Quantitative Ontology asserts that reality “just is”
- Atheistic Qualitative Ontology asserts that certain things are “just good”